al-Qaeda’s Advice for Mujahideen in Iraq: Lessons Learned in Afghanistan

v1.0 – 14 April 2003

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

by Ben Venzke (bvenzke@intelcenter.com) and Aimee Ibrahim (aibrahim@intelcenter.com)

http://www.intelcenter.com
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** .............................................................. 4

**SIGNIFICANCE** ............................................................... 5

**OBSERVATIONS** .............................................................. 6

**AL-QAEDA AND LESSONS LEARNED** ..................................... 7

**SELECTED OBSERVATIONS BY SAIF AL-ADEL ON US OPS** .......... 9

**SELECTED OBSERVATIONS BY SAIF AL-ADEL ON AL-QAEDA OPS** .... 10
- Equipment ........................................................................... 10
- Organizational ..................................................................... 10
- Planning ............................................................................. 11
- Political .............................................................................. 12
- Psychological ...................................................................... 13
- Weapons ............................................................................ 13

**MESSAGE TO OUR PEOPLE IN IRAQ AND THE GULF [REGION]**
**SPECIFICALLY, AND TO OUR ISLAMIC UMMAH IN GENERAL: THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE AGAINST THE AMERICAN INVASION OF QANDAHAR AND LESSONS LEARNED – ENGLISH TRANSLATION** ............... 14

  The First Part: The Program of the Crusader Enemy ................. 15
    First: Psychological Warfare ............................................. 15
    Second: Aerial Warfare ..................................................... 17
    Third: Land Advancement .................................................. 19

  The Second Part: The Program That We Used to Confront the Crusader Enemy ................................................................. 21
    First: The psychological aspect of the war ....................... 21
    Second: The Military Program .......................................... 22
      Airport and Camp Operations Sector ................................ 23
      City Operations Sector ................................................... 24
      Emergency Force ........................................................... 25
    Important Battlefield Advantages ...................................... 25
A Summary of the Last Five Days of My Memories of the Events of Qandahar

MESSAGE TO OUR PEOPLE IN IRAQ AND THE GULF [REGION]
SPECIFICALLY, AND TO OUR ISLAMIC UMMAH IN GENERAL: THE ISLAMIC
RESISTANCE AGAINST THE AMERICAN INVASION OF QANDAHAR AND
LESSONS LEARNED – ORIGINAL ARABIC
INTRODUCTION

The “In the Shadow of the Lances” series first appeared after 9-11. As of mid-April 2003, there have been nine installments. The majority of these were written by al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, who also authored the series’ most often quoted and notorious passage. In an article that became public in June 2002, Ghaith wrote, “We have not reached parity with them [Americans]. We have the right to kill four million Americans – two million of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological weapons.”

In March 2003, al-Qaeda released the fifth and sixth installments of the series. These two articles were written by Saif al-Adel. Al-Adel, who is on the FBI’s Most Wanted List, is believed to be a high-ranking member involved in the group’s military operations. He is a former Egyptian special forces officer who became involved with al-Qaeda through his affiliation with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which was run by al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Al-Adel’s background fits with the subject matter of these two recent pieces, which are studies regarding the lessons learned from US operations in Afghanistan and the tactics, techniques and procedures al-Qaeda utilized to counter them. The focus of this report is on the first and most significant of the two articles written by al-Adel. The article is entitled, “Message to Our People in Iraq and the Gulf [Region] Specifically, and to our Islamic Ummah in General: The Islamic Resistance Against the American Invasion of Qandahar and Lessons Learned.” As the title of the article states, the intended audience for this training material are the fighters operating in Iraq against the US and its coalition allies.

An analysis of the article, as well as a complete translation and the original Arabic, are included in this report.
SIGNIFICANCE

The release of this article follows on the heels of the 11 February 2003 audio statement released by Osama bin Laden prior to the US invasion of Iraq. In that recording, Osama bin Laden laid out his position, stating that it was not the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein that he sought to protect. Rather, he wanted to encourage Muslims to fight against an invading Western army in a Muslim land. Whether or not Hussein’s regime lasted was, to a certain degree, irrelevant.

Saif al-Adel’s intent in releasing this piece follows along with this theme of fighting against the Americans and their coalition partners, while not exerting any special effort to protect the Ba’ath Party. Al-Adel is also continuing a long-practiced al-Qaeda tradition of learning from both its past mistakes and successes, as well as those of others. In this article, al-Adel passes down a portion of the knowledge al-Qaeda has compiled on what worked and did not work in Afghanistan so that those fighting in Iraq against the US will meet with success. He writes, “This message, which was prepared in a hurry, aims at providing our people in the Arab region with a clear picture, from the [battle] field, of the reality of the American enemy and its fighting tactics, and we will use layman’s language and refrain from using military terminology.”

An examination of al-Adel’s article provides useful insight into al-Qaeda’s guerrilla warfare tactics, techniques and procedures in Afghanistan, and what the group will be seeking to employ in Iraq and other future conflicts. It is in essence, one portion of al-Qaeda’s guerrilla warfare playbook.
OBSERVATIONS
The invasion of Iraq by the US and its coalition partners fits perfectly with al-Qaeda’s perception of US designs on the region, and provides al-Qaeda the opportunity to stress the critical importance of its continued struggle. Even a strong show of support by the Iraqi people for the US, as well as actions by the US to put power into the hands of a new Iraqi government will not be enough to change al-Qaeda’s desire to support terrorist and guerrilla actions in Iraq. For al-Qaeda, the coalition presence on the soil of an Arab and Muslim land is enough to justify the need to respond. As Osama bin Laden has already stated, the protection of the Saddam Hussein regime or any other ruling party for that matter are not the focus of their involvement.

Al-Qaeda and similarly-minded groups seek, as they do in Afghanistan, Chechnya and other guerrilla conflicts around the world, to remove the kufr, or infidels, from Muslim land and to establish an Islamic state under the rule of Shari’`a. Consequently, it does not matter if the Saddam Hussein regime has already fallen. As long as there is a coalition presence in Iraq, al-Qaeda and other groups will seek to conduct terrorist and guerrilla operations there against coalition forces and any new government viewed as a puppet of the West. This type of activity was demonstrated in Afghanistan through numerous assassination attempts against President Hamid Karzai and other newly appointed senior government officials.

The recommendations and guidance contained in the article provide insight into the type of fighting we can expect to see in Iraq as al-Qaeda members and other groups begin to conduct operations. The threat posed by these actions have no direct correlation with the level of remaining resistance by forces still fighting for Saddam Hussein. High-levels of guerrilla type attacks can be expected to continue well after all of Hussein’s fedayeen units and senior leadership figures have been rounded up.
AL-QAEDA AND LESSONS LEARNED

Al-Qaeda understands that for its guerrilla or terrorist operations to succeed in the fluid environment in which it currently exists, the group must continually improve upon what strategies worked and change those that did not. A continuous evolutionary process is key to its survival. This process has, in part, been embodied in the writings, training manuals and other material of the group.

As one would expect, the messages delivered in this vein frequently relate to the level of the individual authoring the communication and their role in the organization. Osama bin Laden’s references have been limited and tended to focus on issues of dedication, loyalty and some broad comments on combat issues. Ayman al-Zawahiri has addressed organizational issues in greater detail in his writings, but has followed a similar path as Osama bin Laden in his public communiqués and audio tapes.

Tactics, techniques and procedures are most heavily addressed in written articles appearing in publications that follow the model of Western professional military journals, and in fact, often quote from such US military publications. Saif al-Adel, Abu Laith al-Libi and Abu ‘Ubeid al-Qurashi have all authored or released such material. Some writings have been directed at specific groups, such as Saif al-Adel’s advice to the Iraqi people, while others have focused on a more general audience in order to introduce new concepts to the jihadi community as a whole.

The bi-weekly publication al-Ansar has been one of the most voluminous sources of these types of writings and also the source of a clear example of al-Qaeda’s media awareness and openness to consider different approaches. An article by Abu ‘Ubeid al-Qurashi appeared in the publication in 2002 while the Washington, DC area was struggling to deal with a wave of sniper attacks. The article posed the timely question to all its readers: Have we perhaps overlooked the value of sniping operations in jihadi work?

Apart from the group’s public communications, these articles and other communications are not designed for the public at large but rather the membership of al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups, as well as the greater jihadi community. While they are circulated in a semi-public manner, they are frequently overlooked or ignored by media outlets and rarely get as much press attention as a leaked FBI Intelligence Bulletin warning of the
same tactics. For al-Qaeda, this suits its purposes. Those messages that the group wants to reach a larger audience, such as a new audio tape by Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri, will be released directly or indirectly to media organizations where it will elicit the desired attention. This is most commonly accomplished, although not exclusively, via al-Jazeera. Al-Qaeda recognizes that such a release will likely result in a simultaneous broadcast on major 24-hour news networks, such as CNN and MSNBC. Al-Jazeera is no longer just a release point for messages aimed at the Arab and Muslim world, but rather, it has gained a substantial international audience.

We can expect to see al-Qaeda continue this practice of taking the lessons it has learned through its own experience and through looking at the past successes and failures of other terrorist and rebel organizations in order to better improve its own likelihood of success. These teachings and communications will be incorporated into material taught at training camps but also in al-Qaeda’s “professional” journals where it will be circulated throughout the jihadi community via the Internet and other means.

Due to the energy al-Qaeda places on the training and improvement of tactics, techniques and procedures, it is important to regularly review the activities of various jihadi elements operating in Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas around the world. What the mujahideen fighters perceive as working in one area of the world will be taught and emulated in other areas of operation. Likewise, when new tactics are deployed against mujahideen fighters, these issues will be shared with other fighters around the world in order to develop countering tactics, techniques and procedures.
SELECTED OBSERVATIONS BY SAIF AL-ADEL ON US OPS

- The American enemy prefers to work during the winter months for many reasons, atop of which is the reliance on the psychological warfare that is harmonious with the coldness of the weather and the darkness of the night and what it conceals of the unknown.
- The American battle is a psychological battle that depends on the media and the magical effect of the microphone. … This campaign was successful in some of respects in Afghanistan, due to the absence of the counter psychological warfare in all of its forms. The pinnacle of the success of the media campaign was represented in the role played by the BBC [Radio in Pashtu] during the war, due to the absence of a wide reach of the radio of the Taliban and the scarcity of communications between the groups in the different areas.
- Therefore, the American commanders tend to use the air forces and missile bombardment to vacate the ground from any resistance, paving the way for the advance of the American phonies. The American attack started with the heavy bombardment of sites, which had been monitored and were considered – as they thought – Taliban and al-Qaeda sites and a hiding place for some of the leaders. They used the fast fighter jets and the Cruise missiles in their bombardment.
- The enemy technology could not achieve the desired effect [of finding targets]. Therefore, the enemy depended on the human factor which involved [a person] identifying a site and then it being bombed by air units.
SELECTED OBSERVATIONS BY SAIF AL-ADEL ON AL-QAEDA OPS

Equipment
- The idea of the Corolla vehicles was one of the best and they proved efficient with a capability in maneuver and deceit. They went through unusual operations throughout the duration of the battle with the Americans. We were joking that if the Japanese had seen the vehicles in action, they would have used them for marketing advertisements. The vehicles were explorers on easy terrain and smooth to maneuver in mountainous terrain, were fast and light and could take a crew of four with all their military hardware. The enemy did not notice that we were using them and most were not directly targeted except for the ones with the women who were killed (we will tell this story later).
- Horses and Motorcycles. Horses took the place of cars in transporting administrative things. The Abu Obaida Camp had three motorcycles which the brothers used in the previous days and which had proved their usefulness. It was a very successful idea that the Americans did not notice, and they did not fire one missile against them, even though they were moving around, lifting the wounded and transporting food and water, information, and others while all kinds of airplanes were flying over their heads, to the point where some youngsters bought themselves motorcycles and began jihad on them serving the front. They named the motorcycles the Iron Horse.

Organizational
- Administrative Affairs. We had great flexibility in administrative affairs. We somehow worked between centralization and decentralization throughout the battle. Each small group had its own kitchen. Their larger unit fulfilled their food orders. When the fighting intensified, we established a centralized kitchen which provided three hot meals throughout the fighting and on time.
- Program of Family Evacuation. Our advice was to evacuate women and children from the large cities and send them to villages in order to prepare the large cities for long durations of defense and fighting. The Afghans did that and so did we.
- Evacuating Casualties during the Battle. We did not leave a casualty in the city's hospital, rather we sent them, after doing first aid, to Pakistan. This was done even in the most difficult of times.
- Good Communications, for the enemy works on cutting lines of communications and causing disruption which could be very harmful. That is why it is very important to have alternatives to advanced technology, down to old-fashioned couriers.
Planning

- We would like to say to those who are rushing to victory that the kind of war carried on by the mujahideen depends on a lengthy duration of time and depleting, exhausting and terrorizing the enemy and does not depend on adhering to the land.
- Before the blessed 9/11, we formulated our defensive plan based on the assessment of the situation. We believed that the enemy would initially focus on occupying two centers and then advance to the city. At the least, they would attempt to execute two quick attacks on the same centers for pictures and a media show. Our decision was to block either possibility and not allow them to land there as long as we were in the area.
- But after 9/11, we completely reformulated the military operations in the sector, which evolved more than once to fit the general situation. In the end, it settled on the following: Airport and Camp Operations Sector, City Operations Sector, Emergency Force
- The units were divided into groups made of 10 individuals, dispersed in areas relatively far [from one another] during the day and closer together during the night, taking the form of traps to be combined at the time of operations and easily separated and dispersed immediately afterward.
- We did not form large military sectors so that the air force did not cause massive losses. We relied instead on highly capable small groups and supported each group with a number of veteran holy warriors who fought in many battles, which formed a number of traps ready for the enemy, and which were placed on the main advance front. Secondary fronts were also formulated, thereby covering the complete area into which the enemy might advance or sneak.
- At the back of the airport and in the direction of the city [Qandahar], there was a second line similar to the first line but with dried water sewers. The brothers took advantage of them in taking refuge, making advances and retreating. This line had two purposes. The first was to provide heavy fire support for the trap groups on the first line, and the second was to work as a first line to deflect the enemy's attack in the event the enemy overcame the traps. Behind this line was the monitoring center over the mountain which had the repeater system. It was in the middle between the airport and the city.
- Emergency Force: The hero Hamza al-Zubair took charge of this group. It used to be called the Martyrs Group. It was designed to be a multipurpose rapid deployment force ready to move to any area as a support force or a raid force. The group was equipped with Corolla vehicles along with all the anti-armor, anti-aircraft and howitzer weapons they need, in addition to bombs and side weapons. We placed with him the most experienced,
enthusiastic and courageous brothers, and the most distinguished youngsters in terms of physical fitness and strength, and eagerness to fight and skillful in using weapons and military equipments in all kinds.

- Converting the military force to small units with good administrative capabilities will save us from heavy losses at one hand, and also help in controlling all the fronts with the least possible number of personnel. In addition, converting the people to armed militias will render the mission of the enemy impossible. Large military groups are a problem administratively. They would occupy a large land area, which would make hiding from aerial detection or air bombardment difficult.
- Building covered trenches with more than one entrance inside the yards of homes to avoid bombardment or blockage of the entrance by falling rocks. This is in regard to city inhabitants or areas expected to be bombarded. For defenders of cities, military ABC dictates digging up a trench, but the genius lies in locating the place where the trench is to be dug in order to perform its defensive purpose as well as possible. Regarding trenches, we say that fighting in open areas without aerial cover or good air defenses is a big gamble and the fighter should be camouflaged under a difficult terrain. Buildings in cities act as a hindrance to the plans of the enemy, which also applies to planted areas.
- Our second advice is to train on reconnaissance, traps, and raiding operations and to work in small groups, and avoid by all means working in large groups.
- It is important to choose the appropriate field and prepare it to engage the ground enemy as soon as it advances and falls into the trap area.
- Any country which owns good air defense missiles with long range can defeat the United States of America a humiliating defeat, unless the latter uses weapons of mass destruction to decide the battle. The American forces do not have a single fighter who can advance and occupy the land, and air operations are useless unless there is the soldier who would advance to raise the flag on the liberated land.

**Political**

- Another important matter is to win the regional political battle so that no country or government is allowed to exercise the same role the malicious Pakistani government played. This is the most dangerous role and had the biggest impact in Afghanistan. Pakistan is the one which provided the land for American military forces to advance from, provided them with intelligence, and also provided them with hypocritical people as an alternative to the Taliban State, etc...
Psychological

- We differ completely from our enemy in the psychological fight. While our enemy depended on creating lies about itself, magnifying its power [by saying that] it will not be defeated and the war will not exceed a week as it has sweeping power which can make miracles, and its program depended on terrorizing the competitor because of the Crusaders’ hopelessness in their deteriorating fighting level, we were working on bonding every one with his God and his relation with Him, and He is mighty, strong and keen. Therefore, our program depended on building the Muslim person who believes in the divine secrets, and who realizes that the Book of Allah contains acts not understood except by Allah the Almighty…
- In fact, we did not suffer much psychologically for the simple reason that we did not make it mandatory for the youth to join the training camps. We opened our nation's eyes on its issues and as a result, the youth came forward to fight for the dignity of Islam and Muslims, armed with the hope of becoming martyrs.

Weapons

- The groups were also equipped with a number of SAM-7 missiles, and 107mm rocket launchers carried on pickup trucks, which had a big influence on inflicting heavy losses on enemy personnel.
- We agreed with the Taliban to stop firing all anti-airplane guns, because on the one hand, these planes were outside the range of the guns, and on the other hand, the firing would disclose the location of the guns and expose them to attack. Our plan was to deny the airplanes this opportunity, and to use air defense weapons, SAM-7 missiles, Stinger missiles, launchers, and other guns on vehicles so that all our air defense weapons would be mobile, not stationed in any location and well camouflaged. We would wait until the helicopters came and when they landed for any recovery attempt, we would attack them with all the weapons we had in our hands. We surprised the enemy once and downed an airplane when he tried to storm the house of the Commander of the Faithful. It is noteworthy to mention that SAM-7 missiles were never useful.
MESSAGE TO OUR PEOPLE IN IRAQ AND THE GULF [REGION] SPECIFICALLY, AND TO OUR ISLAMIC UMMAH IN GENERAL: THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE AGAINST THE AMERICAN INVASION OF QANDAHAR AND LESSONS LEARNED – ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(released in jihadi circles in early March 2003)
Translated by Aimee Ibrahim

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

In the Shadow of the Lances Series
The Fifth Chapter
Islamic Research and Studies Center
Edification series (proselytizing, educational, political and military)

Issued by al-Qaeda Organization

Message to Our People in Iraq and the Gulf [region] Specifically, and to our Islamic Ummah in General: The Islamic Resistance Against the American Invasion of Qandahar and Lessons Learned.

Written by: Saif al-Adel

Thanks be to Allah the Lord of the Universe who said in His wisest of inspirations: “This is a plain statement to men, a guidance and admonition to those who ward off. Faint not nor grieve, for ye are superior if you are believers. If a wound hath touched you, be sure a similar wound hath touched others. We bring these days to men by turns and that Allah may know those who believe and take witnesses from among you; and Allah does not love the unjust.” And who also said: “They will not fight you (even) together, except in fortified townships, or from behind walls. Their adversity among themselves is very great; ye think of them as a whole whereas their hearts are diverse. That is because they are a folk who have no sense. Like those shortly before them, they tasted the evil result of their affairs; theirs is painful punishment.” Blessings and peace be upon the Prophet of mercy and slaughter – the smiling, the fighter – and be upon all of his affiliates and companions.
First, we must be certain that victory is from Allah, the all-wise and omnipotent, and [we must be] faithful during battle, in repentance and depending on His might, seeking Him through prayers and supplications. And [we must also be] striving in hard labor, taking into consideration the preparations and readiness for the battle as much as possible.

This message, which was prepared in a hurry, aims at providing our people in the Arab region with a clear picture, from the [battle] field, of the reality of the American enemy and its fighting tactics, and we will use layman’s language and refrain from using military terminology.

The First Part: The Program of the Crusader Enemy

The American enemy prefers to work during the winter months for many reasons, atop of which is the reliance on the psychological warfare that is harmonious with the coldness of the weather and the darkness of the night and what it conceals of the unknown. [Another reason is] the length of time that provides [the enemy] with the chance to strike the largest number of targets. In addition, the cold weather during the winter assists [the enemy’s] individuals in case they decide to advance on the ground. To get to the core of this subject, the enemy depends on three main issues during its war:

First: Psychological Warfare
The American battle is a psychological battle that depends on the media and the magical effect of the microphone. So the war administration as we can see nowadays begins to propagate subjects relating to war and its tactics, the weapons used, and the time period it will take. Then it drops tons of leaflets – boasting, ordering and prohibiting – as if they are in control as they threaten the commanders and demand their surrender to the enemy. [The Americans are] also careful to putrefy the surrounding medium of their rivals through offering generous rewards to whoever kills the so and so leader or reports him. They also stipulate the form of the succeeding regime and nominate its individuals; their stipulation represents a form of terrorizing the will of their rival where they place him under moral siege. Unfortunately, the Arab media is one of the tools of this psychological warfare.

This campaign was successful in some of respects in Afghanistan, due to the absence of the counter psychological warfare in all of its forms. The pinnacle of the success of the
media campaign was represented in the role played by the BBC [Radio in Pashtu] during the war, due to the absence of a wide reach of the radio of the Taliban and the scarcity of communications between the groups in the different areas. That wicked radio station was alone in the Afghan arena and propagated voluminous amounts of lies and fabrications about fictitious battles and concluded results that broke the combating will of the fighters of those areas and led to the loss of the balance of the Taliban and resulted in many unjustified biases. The Islamic media efforts were represented in what was being broadcast by al-Jazeera and the mujahideen sites on the Net, but that was an outside effort unavailable to the Afghan people.

But this campaign has failed in all other respects, atop of which is that in its dramatic failure to poison the Afghan medium, despite using the former communist members, in addition to the strayed and the anomalous from amongst people. Nevertheless, they have failed on the medium of the Afghan mujahideen. The prime evidence of this is the failure of the American enemy to destroy the leaders of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and we are still alive amongst them despite the gigantic rewards, which reached 25 million dollars per head of some of the brothers.

The second important point which proves the failure of the psychological campaign is that it has failed in killing the combat spirit within the mujahideen. It affected them only during the first round of battle, as we, and the observers of the sons of the Ummah saw, the number of fatalities amongst the American enemy and their allies, that was not revealed by the international media, in addition to the several attempts to assassinate the symbols of the enemy, headed by the dummy of Kabul (Karzai) who replaced the Afghan guards with American guards.

It is also known to those who have experience in war, that [war] consists of a number of battles. We verify that most of the battles that took place after the regrouping and rearrangement among the mujahideen lines were all done due to the grace of Allah and for the benefit of Islam and the Muslims. We would like to say to those who are rushing to victory that the kind of war carried on by the mujahideen depends on a lengthy duration of time and depleting, exhausting and terrorizing the enemy and does not depend on adhering to the land.
Second: Aerial Warfare
The American soldier is not fit for combat. This is the truth that the leaders of the Pentagon know, as much as we and everyone who was engaged with them know. The Hollywood promotions will not succeed in the real battlefield. Therefore, the American commanders tend to use the air forces and missile bombardment to vacate the ground from any resistance, paving the way for the advance of the American phonies.

The American attack started with the heavy bombardment of sites, which had been monitored and were considered – as they thought – Taliban and al-Qaeda sites and a hiding place for some of the leaders. They used the fast fighter jets and the Cruise missiles in their bombardment. The number of missiles used during the first night exceeded 400 missiles – some of those were aimed at a housing compound that belonged to al-Qaeda that was evacuated before 11 September. The bombardment destroyed about a quarter of the complex (20 houses) damaging those houses in various ways. Bombardment continued the same way after the [evening prayer] to almost dawn. These raids continued for three weeks and the final results were as following: almost complete destruction of the housing compound both on the interior and the exterior (it is a little more than one square kilometer). And I want to confirm that during this period, none of our military sites in the region, which are located not more than three hundred meters from the housing compound, were bombed. Additionally, during this period, we did not lose a single one of our brothers, for at this time, the enemy was denied land surveillance. Our field preparation was great, thanks to Allah. The bombing on our sites stopped, but continued on our brothers, the Taliban. And because of the cooperation with the Pakistani and Russian intelligence [agencies], the Americans were given maps of some of the Taliban sites, which were originally old locations for the Afghan army and the Russian forces so they bombed the ammunition reserve, destroying those sites. Likewise, they bombed the residence of Mullah Omar, the “prince of believers”, may Allah protect him.

The enemy technology could not achieve the desired effect [of finding targets]. Therefore, the enemy depended on the human factor which involved [a person] identifying a site and then it being bombed by air units.

After that, the bombardment continued in a weak way, as there were no valuable targets in the great city (Qandahar). At this time, the mujahideen’s wireless communications were jammed, and a number of hypocritical Afghans that were involved with the
Pakistani intelligence [agency] were activated in order to collect current intelligence on the Arab goals in the city and identify some government facilities. By the end of the month of Sha’ban and the beginning of the month of Ramadan, the bombardment began again, using other means that took two forms:

First: The targeting of civilians (according to their description) by bombing the city and the adjacent villages. Buildings with Islamic and military features were bombed. The Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice was bombed, as was the Pilgrimage Affairs building. They bombed some of the food warehouses, and (Qul Urdu) which is the site for the city’s defense forces. Some of the houses of the leaders of al-Qaeda and the Taliban were also bombed. And outside the city, some of the neighboring villages were bombed, and the bombardment intensified on the roads, leading to burnt cars, especially fuel trucks. This bombardment led to many casualties of Afghani people (men, women and children), and a number of Arab mujahideen men, women and children were martyred (34, including 26 men, six women and two children). I recounted all the details in my diary on the events of Qandahar. I gave my notebook to the administrators of the site (Islamic Study and Research Center) to be published at the right time – and the bombing continued in the same way until the start of the final week of Ramadan.

Second: The bombing of military sites to facilitate the advancement of ground troops. The American bombardment did not succeed in causing any deterioration or effect on defensive sites, be it the weapons stored there or the soldiers therein. And of course the American ground forces did not have any intention to enter Qandahar after painful battles, lessons in the art of land warfare (the operation on the house of the Prince of Believers [Mullah Mohammed Omar] in Qandahar, the operation on the Sahar airport south of Qandahar and the mujahideen camp in Balush in the Jabal Malek near the southern border of Afghanistan near Pakistan). We will mention, God willing, these operations and its results in another episode of this blessed series. And based on the results of the previous operations, the American leadership has appointed the criminal, Gal Agha, for him and his follower to take over the ground job, where the American forces would offer the facilitating air raids and air support during the battles. At that stage, the US forces used whatever weapons they could get their hands on. So B-52 planes were seen in the skies of Qandahar, and they threw seven tons of missiles and combed the battle field with all the advanced technology – the smart and stupid missiles,
Cruise missiles and the heavy bombs, helicopters, jets, C-130s and B-52s – covering the Qandahar sky consecutively in a stormy campaign. We did not rest day or night. The results of this period were as follows: the martyrdom of 22 mujahideen brothers and the striking of a number of our cars and two tanks. But our enemy could not advance one inch on the ground as we will mention in the next paragraph.

**Third: Land Advancement**

The last stage of the American war is the ground advancement of the American soldier. It was replaced, after massive failure in very easy operations, by the Afghani fighters, which were the remains of the communists and those who were recruited with money which were represented in the forces of Gal Agha, who is immoral and without creed.

The enemy forces, which work under the flag of the cross, moved forward from only one axis, hoping to deploy the troops after passing the main bridge, then to move toward Qandahar airport to prepare it for receiving the American planes, then to prepare for invading the city which is about 25 km from it.

This did not happen, thanks to Allah and the intention of the brothers to accomplish martyrdom. The ground battle continued for five days and nights in waves – as soon as the air raids stopped, the land attacks would begin. And when the land battle was ending, the air raids would start. And therefore and thereon five days without stop, as the whiz of the planes did not leave the sky. The bombing sounds did not stop; the bullet sounds were many, interrupting the communicating devices. It was a wild combat. The enemy did his best, and what encouraged him was that the battlefield was flat and easy, permeated with some plants, rivers and valleys. The field was free from the topographic obstacles that hinder the advancement of the enemy, except the hearts of the brothers which were as full of fighting will and love for martyrdom and the valiant defense of the capital of the Islamic country.

The enemy did its best in the battle but it failed to pass the main bridge. And among all its success, it failed in a trap that was set carefully and skillfully. And our enemy losses continued to an extent which exceeded its ability to regress once more. So our enemy stayed firm its position behind the bridge, and no longer thought about crossing it once more.
The enemy had lost its land battle in Afghanistan, as is usual during fighting with us in Afghanistan. This characteristic defeat did not change and will not change, God willing, in the war with Iraq.

And in conclusion of the previous matters, we will say that the enemy did the following:

(1) Psychological war (deforming the facts and creating lies – threatening – buying the people’s consciences – reports – BBC – showing the American scarecrow on a huge scale – magnifying the war machine and its burning capability – the rewards for information about the leaders ...and so on).
(2) Air war (air bombing using helicopters, Jets, C-130s and B-52s and Cruise missiles, and the bombs which weigh tons to hit vital centers and basic utilities, using better guides - interrupting the communication devises - hitting civilians - and supporting land advancement).
(3) Ground advancement (it depends on some of the hypocritical forces which are supported by the air forces or enemy forces with military land equipment which is also covered by air support ... these forces did not achieve any success in any battle).

The US has used all what can grant it its war goals, and the results till today, according to their perspective, are massive failures, regarding the volume of troops, capabilities, expenses – comparing what the coalition has with what mujahideen have, and the losses they got – in their point view. If we look at the current situation in the second year of war, the desired security has never been achieved. Additionally, they did not capture the leader of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. And we did not see any political agenda for the groups of thieves in Kabul. The Afghani cities which were united and in which security was spread during the time of the Taliban, today no longer exist. All the efforts the American enemy exerted confirm their bad intentions to establish a double agent leadership, and divide the country and steal its wealth. Therefore, America cannot change the Afghani view about it. Currently, the imposed government in Kabul does not control anything but the palace it lives in, and the coalition forces now are creating excuses to leave Afghanistan. But the mujahideen are still in the battlefield, and the fight continues and will not end, God willing, until Afghanistan returns to Shari`a [Islamic law] and Islam once more.
The Second Part: The Program That We Used to Confront the Crusader Enemy

We started our program in many aspects:

First: The psychological aspect of the war
We differ completely from our enemy in the psychological fight. While our enemy depended on creating lies about itself, magnifying its power [by saying that] it will not be defeated and the war will not exceed a week as it has sweeping power which can make miracles, and its program depended on terrorizing the competitor because of the Crusaders’ hopelessness in their deteriorating fighting level, we were working on bonding every one with his God and his relation with Him, and He is mighty, strong and keen. Therefore, our program depended on building the Muslim person who believes in the divine secrets, and who realizes that the Book of Allah contains acts not understood except by Allah the Almighty – His greatness brings life and ends life, and His greatness glorifies and humiliates. These acts can show the valiant souls that they will not be returned except to Allah. And thus let America and whoever is with it come and [the result] will not be but what Allah wants.

In this regard, we organized an active program led by students from the Shari`a [Islamic law] Committee and a number of our Arab brothers who led a perpetual campaign, during which they remained steadfast in operation sites, and God chose Sheikh Abu Yousef the Mauritanian as a martyr. During the month of Ramadan, all the brothers listened to a daily program before Iftar [breaking fast] about intelligence services. We also found out that many Afghan brothers also anxiously waited for and listened to the program in the city or from their fighting positions.

In fact, we did not suffer much psychologically for the simple reason that we did not make it mandatory for the youth to join the training camps. We opened our nation's eyes on its issues and as a result, the youth came forward to fight for the dignity of Islam and Muslims, armed with the hope of becoming martyrs. They had an instinctive desire to fight the Americans, as did their ancestors who preferred Beni Al Asfar to others. To clarify the picture, we started the Qandahar airport defense program two weeks before the events of September 11, with only 25 brothers around the airport and about 50 more in the city. This number increased dramatically in the following two months and reached
800 fighters during the month of Ramadan, in addition to more than 2,000 mujahideen coming from all over the world. During the first week of Ramadan, one of our brothers called from an area close to the border to tell us that he had 350 brothers with him. All the mujahideen in Afghanistan and those spread around the world were anxious to fight for the Islamic state and to become a martyr for the sake of God. This is the true motivation behind the heroic stand of the mujahideen, and their ability to handle extremely difficult tasks.

All the nations of the world will not be able to squash the spark Mohammed Atta and his hero brothers ignited in the hearts of the youngsters of the Ummah with their blessed operation. The blood of each and every martyr meeting his Creator was also the biggest motivation that led all of those who were with him. The sweet smell of martyrdom, along with their captivating smiles, lit the fire of competition to become martyrs and be in the presence of God. Many times I had to ask the leaders of the groups to restrain the fervor of the youngsters and not let them chase the enemy outside the realm of the set plan.

**Second: The Military Program**

God blessed us [with the ability] to arrange a flexible program that is appropriate with the kind of incoming threat - a program that would fend off the threat and absorb the increase in numbers we are accustomed to getting in the years of jihad when the fronts were on fire. The program also gradually and naturally evolved in accordance with battlefield conditions, which imposed themselves on everyone.

Before the blessed 9/11, we formulated our defensive plan based on the assessment of the situation. We believed that the enemy would initially focus on occupying two centers and then advance to the city. At the least, they would attempt to execute two quick attacks on the same centers for pictures and a media show. Our decision was to block either possibility and not allow them to land there as long as we were in the area. The centers were Abu Obaida al-Bunshari Camp, close to the residential complex, and the Qandahar airport, which is about four kilometers away from the first center.

But after 9/11, we completely reformulated the military operations in the sector, which evolved more than once to fit the general situation. In the end, it settled on the following:
1. Airport and Camp Operations Sector
2. City Operations Sector
3. Emergency Force

**Airport and Camp Operations Sector**
Our forces were deployed in front of the airport and camp areas along an area that was 6 kilometers wide, thus occupying the eastern and western parts of the main advance front. The fighting force was to be divided into three irregular units. One unit occupied the eastern part of the road, the other the western part, while the third occupied the second line. The units were divided into groups made of 10 individuals, dispersed in areas relatively far [from one another] during the day and closer together during the night, taking the form of traps to be combined at the time of operations and easily separated and dispersed immediately afterward.

We did not form large military sectors so that the air force did not cause massive losses. We relied instead on highly capable small groups and supported each group with a number of veteran holy warriors who fought in many battles, which formed a number of traps ready for the enemy, and which were placed on the main advance front. Secondary fronts were also formulated, thereby covering the complete area into which the enemy might advance or sneak.

These forces were deployed in main and alternate trenches. The trenches were carefully camouflaged to render enemy detection difficult. Others [forces] were dispersed in a number of ruined buildings which were all over the area. The first line was equipped with a number of medium howitzers, some non-reflective guns and a network of heavy machine guns carried on vehicles, in addition to anti-aircraft guns. The groups were also equipped with a number of SAM-7 missiles, and 107mm rocket launchers carried on pickup trucks, which had a big influence on inflicting heavy losses on enemy personnel.

At the back of the airport and in the direction of the city, there was a second line similar to the first line but with dried water sewers. The brothers took advantage of them in taking refuge, making advances and retreating. This line had two purposes. The first was to provide heavy fire support for the trap groups on the first line, and the second was to work as a first line to deflect the enemy's attack in the event the enemy overcame the traps.
Behind this line was the monitoring center over the mountain which had the repeater system. It was in the middle between the airport and the city.

**City Operations Sector**
After that, the city begins. To cover it, we divided the force into two formations, an internal security force, and a military protection force covering the outskirts of the city and serving as a third line of defense after the airport groups, thus surrounding Qandahar from all directions. Some of the forces were stationed on the roads.

First, the eastern and northeastern front: On the road coming from Pakistan, passing the airport and heading toward the city, we placed the heroic group of Abu Mustafa al-Iraqi, a gunner of SAM-7 missiles, who is a former officer in the Iraqi military (who fired more than 20 missiles from the beginning of Ramadan), and beside him the group of the brother [left blank] the Syrian, and the group of brother Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Masri, who is a former armored officer in the Egyptian military. Their mission was to block the road coming from Kabul alternately or to support Abu Mustafa or Mowahid if necessary.

Second, the southern front: There are two passageways leading to the city, one comes from the back of the airport parallel to the main road, and the other comes from the outskirts of the villages of the Gal Agha group. Blocking this front has been handled by... the Najdi [from Najd in Saudi Arabia] and the Mullah Bilal al-Makki [from Makkah in Saudi Arabia].

Third, the western front: Coming from Herat City. Handled by three groups, the first was the group of the trainer Firas the Yemeni, which was in the al-Farouq Camp and has occupied, at the beginning of Ramadan, Wilsawy Moyond, about 30 km of Qandahar. At the entrance of the city, there were two groups, the first was Abu Masaab the Jordanian’s group, which came from Hirat after its fall and has a heroic story in rescuing the assistant of the Wali when the city fell, and Sharif the Egyptian’s group with the brothers who recently arrived from Bosnia to participate in defending the Islamic state.

Fourth, the Northeastern Front: Was occupied by the al-Zabeer al-Haeili. Secures the side roads coming from the outskirts of Arzjan Province.
The security forces inside the city were under the command of Abu Yasser the Algerian, assisted by Abu al-Tayib ... . This group worked night and day and apprehended a number of spies and handed them to the Taliban Security. After the first week of Ramadan, the group was in control of the city at night along with the Taliban posts. They were dispersed throughout the city. The group was formed of 70 youngsters, while the military forces defending the city numbered around 270 youngsters.

**Emergency Force**

The hero Hamza al-Zubair took charge of this group. It used to be called the Martyrs Group. It was designed to be a multipurpose rapid deployment force ready to move to any area as a support force or a raid force. The group was equipped with Corolla vehicles along with all the anti-armor, anti-aircraft and howitzer weapons they need, in addition to bombs and side weapons. We placed with him the most experienced, enthusiastic and courageous brothers, and the most distinguished youngsters in terms of physical fitness and strength, and eagerness to fight and skillful in using weapons and military equipments in all kinds. This was a marvelous group, always ready to be present in any place and time.

**Important Battlefield Advantages**

1. Converting the military force to small units with good administrative capabilities will save us from heavy losses at one hand, and also help in controlling all the fronts with the least possible number of personnel. In addition, converting the people to armed militias will render the mission of the enemy impossible. Large military groups are a problem administratively. They would occupy a large land area, which would make hiding from aerial detection or air bombardment difficult.

2. The idea of the Corolla vehicles was one of the best and they proved efficient with a capability in maneuver and deceit. They went through unusual operations throughout the duration of the battle with the Americans. We were joking that if the Japanese had seen the vehicles in action, they would have used them for marketing advertisements. The vehicles were explorers on easy terrain and smooth to maneuver in mountainous terrain, were fast and light and could take a crew of four with all their military hardware. The enemy did not notice that we were using them and most were not directly targeted except for the ones with the women who were killed (we will tell this story later).
3. We agreed with the Taliban to stop firing all anti-airplane guns, because on the one hand, these planes were outside the range of the guns, and on the other hand, the firing would disclose the location of the guns and expose them to attack. Our plan was to deny the airplanes this opportunity, and to use air defense weapons, SAM-7 missiles, Stinger missiles, launchers, and other guns on vehicles so that all our air defense weapons would be mobile, not stationed in any location and well camouflaged. We would wait until the helicopters came and when they landed for any recovery attempt, we would attack them with all the weapons we had in our hands. We surprised the enemy once and downed an airplane when he tried to storm the house of the Commander of the Faithful. It is noteworthy to mention that SAM-7 missiles were never useful.

4. Administrative Affairs. We had great flexibility in administrative affairs. We somehow worked between centralization and decentralization throughout the battle. Each small group had its own kitchen. Their larger unit fulfilled their food orders. When the fighting intensified, we established a centralized kitchen which provided three hot meals throughout the fighting and on time.

Horses and Motorcycles. Horses took the place of cars in transporting administrative things. The Abu Obaida Camp had three motorcycles which the brothers used in the previous days and which had proved their usefulness. It was a very successful idea that the Americans did not notice, and they did not fire one missile against them, even though they were moving around, lifting the wounded and transporting food and water, information, and others while all kinds of airplanes were flying over their heads, to the point where some youngsters bought themselves motorcycles and began jihad on them serving the front. They named the motorcycles the Iron Horse.

5. Program of Family Evacuation. Our advice was to evacuate women and children from the large cities and send them to villages in order to prepare the large cities for long durations of defense and fighting. The Afghans did that and so did we. The number of families in Qandahar was 116 families, with an average number of 464 individuals. The number of holy warriors in Qandahar was 800. We can say that from the moment the bombardment began on 20 Rajab (October 7) until we reached Zirmat on Ramadan 22, the number of martyrs was 79, among them six women and two children. It was by the grace of God that the Crusader forces, and those working under their command, did not
find even one Arab holy warrior to capture, and those forces did not see even one Arab family.

6. Evacuating Casualties during the Battle. We did not leave a casualty in the city's hospital, rather we sent them, after doing first aid, to Pakistan. This was done even in the most difficult of times. On the day of withdrawal, only 15 brothers were left in the hospital, nine who were able to move were smuggled, and the remaining six were not able to move. The Afghans armed them, and even though they were not able to move, they continued to resist the Americans until the Americans assassinated them in the hospital by throwing bombs and attacking them with RBG missiles, burning them as a result, and marking another disgraceful act to be added to the vile American record.

7. Building covered trenches with more than one entrance inside the yards of homes to avoid bombardment or blockage of the entrance by falling rocks. This is in regard to city inhabitants or areas expected to be bombarded. For defenders of cities, military ABC dictates digging up a trench, but the genius lies in locating the place where the trench is to be dug in order to perform its defensive purpose as well as possible. Regarding trenches, we say that fighting in open areas without aerial cover or good air defenses is a big gamble and the fighter should be camouflaged under a difficult terrain. Buildings in cities act as a hindrance to the plans of the enemy, which also applies to planted areas.

These [trenches] help in hiding the location, and facilitates the operations of traps for any ground attack unit. Our second advice is to train on reconnaissance, traps, and raiding operations and to work in small groups, and avoid by all means working in large groups.

8. It is important to choose the appropriate field and prepare it to engage the ground enemy as soon as it advances and falls into the trap area. This will take away all the capabilities of the air forces and keep them outside the conflict until the engagement line is cut. As we said, the American soldier is qualified to perform cinematic roles only and the enemy will lose his heaviest casualties in these traps.

9. It is impossible to win against the people no matter what the enemy possesses in weaponry, technical capabilities, and advanced technology. Victory over the United States is very possible and easy beyond the imagination of many. It has several components; the most important is the elimination of the hypocritical forces fighting on
behalf of the American soldier. This group is weak militarily, shaken psychologically. It is mercenary, without any cause; its representation in the war was trifle.

Also, any country which owns good air defense missiles with long range can defeat the United States of America a humiliating defeat, unless the latter uses weapons of mass destruction to decide the battle. The American forces do not have a single fighter who can advance and occupy the land, and air operations are useless unless there is the soldier who would advance to raise the flag on the liberated land.

Another important matter is to win the regional political battle so that no country or government is allowed to exercise the same role the malicious Pakistani government played. This is the most dangerous role and had the biggest impact in Afghanistan. Pakistan is the one which provided the land for American military forces to advance from, provided them with intelligence, and also provided them with hypocritical people as an alternative to the Taliban State, etc...

10. Good Communications, for the enemy works on cutting lines of communications and causing disruption which could be very harmful.

That is why it is very important to have alternatives to advanced technology, down to old-fashioned couriers.

A Summary of the Last Five Days of My Memories of the Events of Qandahar

On the following day, the signs of victory began when the Americans pushed Gal Agha’s forces to advance on the ground, saying that they had bombarded the area in the last days and there was no detection now of forces on the ground, so they needed to advance. The enemy advanced and reached the broken bridge and began to advance toward the trap points. One of the youngsters was wondering about the hesitant vehicle on the bridge coming from the direction of the enemy. He cautiously advanced toward it, camouflaging as much as he could while sending reports about the situation to Abi al-Hassan. When he surprised them, they fled and he fired at them and they exchanged fire while fleeing. This was, then, a first test to find out if the area was empty.
Then hell broke out in the area. Airplanes came from every direction and in all kinds. C-130s attacked, jets attacked with missiles, helicopters attacked with missiles and guns. The area was transformed into a ball of fire for more than an hour. Gal Agha’s forces began to advance again, assured that there were no breathing souls left in the area, other than their forces. As soon as they entered the killing field, bombs of the youngsters rained on them from every direction, and they were gunned down with machineguns. Calls of "God is great" and victory were screamed aloud. The brothers killed many of them and captured two. The rest fled. The air force could not interfere because the two sides were engaged. It was a success by the will of God Almighty. The trap was prepared marvelously, and the youngsters performed their role skillfully, which is not surprising since Mowhad, Abu al-Hassan, Abu Bakr the Syrian, Salah al-Din, and Abd al-Wahab, who are among the heroes of Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia, were with them.

Quickly, the situation changed again and airplanes returned; their roars were heard from afar. This time, they flattened the ground and continued bombing it for two hours or more, while Sheikh Abu... al-BM was in the monitoring center reporting to the dwellers of the city, whether Arabs or foreigners. The ardor of the city force was aroused and they wanted to go fight, but I prevented them and told them that we would have our moment. The Americans ended the bombardment close to sunset, while people were still fasting in their holes. No food was prepared. I contacted Abu al-Tayib ... and asked him to buy food from the market and send it over to the brothers on the front, and told him that the following day we would turn the Religious Institute into a general kitchen for the front, serving three meals a day regularly. I contacted the youngsters on the front and told them that they had to eat their breakfast meal. Abu al-Tayib managed the kitchen very well and provided food throughout the following days, sometimes by cars, sometimes on foot, and sometimes by motorcycles. No meal was late to the holy warriors. Night descended and the bombardment was still on. The youngsters noticed the lights of an incoming car again, and here Amir al-Fateh (who named his tank the Elephant) asked Abi al-Hassan to watch the cars, so that when they reach the agreed-upon point, Amir, who prepared his tank for that, would attack them. Communication over the system was clear, aircrafts were hovering in the sky, and the cars were moving very slowly on the ground. Abu al-Hassan was slowly saying "wait Amir... wait Amir" then he screamed "now hit". Amir released the forces of his Elephant and burned by God's blessing the first car. All the cars retreated, fleeing. The airplanes returned looking all night and wondering where the
Elephant was. The Apaches could not find him. The Gal Agha forces were not able to attack again that night.

On the second day of the third week, we put the rocket launcher BM12 on a pickup truck. When Sheikh Abu… al-BM heard about it, he hurried and asked me to be in charge of it. I could not turn him down. He formed his group and requested my permission to be free to operate and move around in the area. I blessed him, and Sheikh Abu… al-BM moved to the airport handing Saqr Mountain to his assistant brother Abu Khabbab...

Fighting stopped in most of Afghanistan and the battle began in Qandahar at the outskirts of the airport and Aurzjan. We did not yet cover that sector, so I asked Sa’douf to contact the brothers in Khost and ask them to send a group to cover this breach. I went to Mullah Brader who was in charge of the fighting in the outskirts of Aurzjan and told him that we would support him with a hundred youngsters to strengthen the northern front.

We had with us two trucks with a launcher from the Taliban. They were supporting the defense of the youngsters. On the following day, with repeated attacks from airplanes, and attempts of the Gal Agha forces to advance, and while the youngsters began to deflect the attack, the two trucks were hit and the Taliban operating them were martyred. They were the last Afghani group fighting with us. I asked them for weapons and ammunitions; they gave us the airport depots. The Commander of the Faithful would encourage us from time to time to be economical in the use of Kalashnikov ammunition, due to their scarcity. When we lost the two trucks, we immediately pushed the car, which had the launcher, and things returned to normal. Sheikh Abu… al-BM was able through his experience to manage the portable launcher with rare military flexibility and skill. He turned points where Gal Agha groups gathered to hell. The only goal of the air force afterward was to search and find the portable launcher. When they gave up looking for it, they decided to attack the whole village. B-52s came and bombed the mountains and the flat lands, and flew over the village where the launcher was. They did not leave a home without bombing it, until they got to the place where the experienced sheikh was. He pushed his youngsters away from the launcher and the place collapsed. The whole village came under a cloud of dust, smoke and gunpowder, and communication with the Sheikh was lost. I got worried about him, but half an hour later, heard his voice quietly over the communication system asking for some digging tools. I realized that something was
going on. The launcher was hit after three days and nights of tough fighting. Among his crew, Abu Osama the Somali was martyred.

The companies stationed around the airport were starting to wear out from the continuous fighting. They had been fighting all day and watching all night. I asked Abi al-Harith the Egyptian to rotate the groups so they might rest, provided that the companies stationed around the airport would take the positions of the companies who were in towns. I assigned to him the company of Abu Abd al-Rahman the Egyptian. Then the hero Abu Mustafa contacted me and said using the Iraqi dialect: “What, oh Abd al-Ahad?! We Iraqis and Kurds are men of war and fighting. We can only dig and fight. Why would you leave us in town? We do not have anything to do with cookies [symbol of comfort]!” I told him to rejoice, and contacted Abi al-Harith the Egyptian and told him that “the company of Abi Mustafa is at your command, but it is a large one.” The Sheikh Abi al-Harith the Egyptian moved [him] with his company to replace the company of Abi al-Hassan and take their positions. The battle intensified and lasted five days without respite, in which the Army of Allah won crushing victories and very few martyrs were killed, except for the third or fourth night, I do not recall, when the enemy advanced and was met by the hero Mowhad and the men of his company, who were like lions waiting for their preys to fall in the trap. He asked “Can you see them, oh Abd al-Wahab?” and Abd al-Wahab said “yes.” And then Mowhad said “keep your position, Salah is coming from the right and I will attack from the center.” That is when Abu Hashim al-Sayyed, who came from a rear position when he heard of the advance, interfered rapidly in the transmission and said: “Oh Mowhad, do you need me?” Mowhad asked, “Where are you, may Allah be pleased with you?” and Abu Hashim replied “I am close.” Then he left the car and ran on the road in company of Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, Hamza the Qatari, Abu Yussef the Mauritanian, Abu Amir..., Samir the Najdi and several youths who, in their excitement, took to the road, running without fear of the enemy, the airplanes, or the bombs. Abu Hashim al-Sayyed was ahead of everyone else. He was yelling in the radio “May Allah reward you, oh Mowhad. I am your brother, do not go without me!” Mowhad was prompting him “May Allah have mercy on your parents, where are you? You are late.” And Abu Hashim al-Sayyed replied “I am close.” Then, Abu Hashim was heard on the radio running and inciting the youths to jihad and he swore he could smell the scent of paradise. Then his voice was cut. Fervor took Mowhad and he asked for more youths from Abi al-Harith the Egyptian to attack and kill the enemies of Allah who fell in the trap and destroy them after that. I contacted
Abi al-Harith the Egyptian and we changed to the private frequency. I told him to “beware for Mowhad is upset and excited. Do not let the youths move [from their positions]. The company of Abu Hashim al-Sayyed should be enough for him. Do not let them move beyond the trap.” The Sheikh Abu Harith the Egyptian said “I understand that, but it is getting hot here. I will try to calm the youths and make them keep their positions.” I went back to the “general” frequency. Mowhad and his brothers were harvesting “the souls of the enemy,” greatening Allah and walking between corpses. Then he started running ahead in pursuit of the enemy who was retreating. He took the youths with him. They left their positions and followed him running on the road, like the company of Abu Hashim. At this point, the airplanes intervened and started bombing the road, and as I mentioned, Abu Hashim said that he could smell the scent of paradise. Then the hero fell in martyrdom and other heroes fell around him. Thus fell the martyrs Sheikh Abu Yussef the Mauritanian, Hamza the Qatari, and I have personally felt the wonderful scent that was covering him and his face was wearing a beautiful smile, and what a smile that was - as well as Samir the Najdi who seemed very gracious and beautiful in death despite the blood covering his body. Abu Amar... lost a foot. As for Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, he was not wounded. The bombing intensified and the two tanks commanded by Amir al-Fatah and Khalid al-Habib joined the battle, as well as the machinegun manned by Adham the Egyptian and Abu Amar the Palestinian. There were between them and the aircrafts impressive duels, and some extraordinarily courageous deeds. The aircrafts in the sky were firing everywhere, while they were shooting from their machinegun at the aircrafts. They could not reach the aircrafts, which were far in the sky, and the missiles dropping from the sky did not reach them. The duel lasted for quite a while. Amir al-Fatah used his tank to fire [at the airplanes], and so did Khalid al-Habib. However, his tank was hit directly by a missile, and a second one exploded close by. The whole crew escaped safely except for Khalid who received a fragment in his head that deprived him from the use of his left side for four months. However, he recovered after that and only his left hand bears signs of the wound. Currently he is back to training in a secret base near the Pakistani-Afghani border in one of al-Qaeda's secret bases. As for Amir al-Fatah's Elephant, it was very respected by the Americans. They kept looking for it. Then they divided the area in squares and scanned them until they found the Elephant and destroyed it. However, Amir al-Fatah and his crew escaped to safety after a fierce battle where the Elephant humiliated the Apaches. However, the Elephant earned himself a “medal of honor” in this battle.
Thus, we lost our heavy back-up in tanks, as well as the missile launcher, and this is a serious matter. However, the enemy lost a large number of its fighters and their fighting spirit was crushed, and after that, they only shot [at us] from a distance. The Americans could not entice them to advance any more. We had won the ground battle which lasted five days, without respite. [We had won] thanks to Allah, even though, we did not have any modern anti-aircraft weapons, while the enemy had everything ranging from M-16s to bombs that weigh seven and eight tons which destroyed and [screened] the area without shaking the will of the brothers [who] did not back down, not one single step. The youths after that felt the exhilaration of victory. Abu Hafs the Mauritanian and [Abu Osama...] as well, used the radio to [remind] that victory is bestowed by Allah and by his Grace, praised be Allah. The youths prayed to Allah and praised Him for their [victory]. Four martyrs and two wounded was the result of the operation that led the brothers to defeat the enemy, and they [the enemy] took the next few days to consolidate their positions in that area; that was all they did.

In conclusion, I would like to stress a few points:
1. The organization of the Jihadi base, known as al-Qaeda, is the organization of the Islamic Ummah and it is based on its creed and defends its interests. The members of al-Qaeda are the sons of the Ummah whose faith is Islam. All the [financial] and material capabilities of al-Qaeda, are the sum of the “savings” of the Ummah used to seek Allah's blessing, be He praised.

2. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Ummah did not fight enough against the hideous international triangle known as the alliance between the Jews and the Crusaders and consisting of the decadent United States, Britain and the Jews.

3. The so-called Arab intellectuals who claim wisdom and reason and use it to “talk” to the West, are only accomplices of CIA operatives and constitute the fifth column that is working for the interests of the enemy within our countries and at all levels, in order to justify the coming invasion of the region and the terror that will be practiced against its peoples.

4. The rulers of the Islamic Ummah without exception, are useless to their faith and their Ummah, and they are no longer useful to the authority that appointed them.
5. The armies of Islamic countries have to liberate [themselves] from their political leaderships, who rent them to fight for the enemy of the faith.

6. Islamic peoples are the hope, and thanks to their jihad and their support to the Islamic changes against the alliance between the Crusaders and the Jews, they are, without any contentions, evening the balance of power. Their sons are the striking forces and they are the real strategic and funding force. They also are the final beneficiary of this war.

7. We do not, by the will of Allah, doubt the final defeat of the American empire, and we bring to our Ummah the joy for [this defeat]. What happened in Afghanistan is only one battle. The war is still going on and the victory is leaning towards the Army of Allah. This empire of Crusaders and Jews is walking to its destruction in the blessed region of the Gulf.

8. We advise our dear Ummah to turn back to Allah the Almighty secretly and publicly in order to [witness] the realization of Allah's promise: "Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion - the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace: 'They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me. 'If any do reject Faith after this, they are rebellious and wicked." [Qur'an, Surat Al-Noor; 24.55]. And as He, the Almighty, said: "the promise of Allah. Never does Allah depart from His promise: but most men understand not." [Qur'an, Surat Al-Rum; 30.6].

9. We also encourage all the peoples of our Ummah and ask them to arm and store ammunitions and start the fight and the jihad against the alliance of the Crusaders and the Jews and their interests in all Muslim countries. By doing so, they will strengthen the unity of the Ummah, as the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said: "...the believers as regards their being merciful among themselves and showing love among themselves and being kind, resemble one body, so that, if any part of the body is not well then the whole body shares the sleeplessness (insomnia) and fever with it."

10. Once again we repeat that we seek the help of Allah, the Almighty, against His enemies, and we ask Him to "use" us and grant us and our Ummah success in our jihad.
for His [faith], under the banner of “there is no God but Allah and Mohammed is the Messenger of Allah,” and to spread His faith and His laws on Earth.

And I bid you farewell until the next episode, by the will of Allah. And our last prayer is praise be to Allah the “Cherisher” and Sustainer of the Worlds.
MESSAGE TO OUR PEOPLE IN IRAQ AND THE GULF [REGION] SPECIFICALLY, AND TO OUR ISLAMIC UMMAH IN GENERAL: THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE AGAINST THE AMERICAN INVASION OF QANDAHAR AND LESSONS LEARNED – ORIGINAL ARABIC

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

رحلة: الحرب العالمية
الحرب العالمية الأولى لا تتبع الخطة، هذه الحقيقة يعترف بها العالم. كما تعرفنا على كل منا، ونازل وراء مسار في محاولة لنزول على رأسها. العديد من العوامل المتهمة بقتل العالم الإنساني، وقد وضعنا نشر الفضول هذا الطموح من الحرب.

وقد نحن في محاولة appName في مختلف الإنترنت، وقد проведен-fold على إعداد إعداد للعالمية إلى الفضاء من خلال لعبة الحرب.

الخطة: استخدام المدنية (عندد وصيغتهم) تبقى على نزل، وفقاً للغرب والغرب المشتركة.

أطلق عليه المصبوغ الكون ليسي، بدون أن يكون لاحقاً. وذلك لرؤية نزول على نظرية إعداد للعالمية في المحفظة.

 Grip on the world's hotspots، وفقاً للغرب، وقد وصلنا على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغرب.

استخدم المؤسسة العسكرية لتبدأ من مكان الأدوات المائية الاتصال، وكان ذلك لرؤية نزول على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغرب.

أطلق عليه المصبوغ الكون للعالمية، وفقاً للغرب، وقد وصلنا على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغرب.

 Grip on the world's hotspots، وفقاً للغرب، وقد وصلنا على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغرب.

 Grip on the world's hotspots، وفقاً للغرب، وقد وصلنا على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغرب.

 Grip on the world's hotspots، وفقاً للغرب، وقد وصلنا على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغرب.

 Grip on the world's hotspots، وفقاً للغرب، وقد وصلنا على رأسها. وهو نهج مختلف يتميز بآخر التصفح، وفقاً للغربي.
أتمبر: ندعم الأردن

أتأخر موقع في الحرب العربية هو انتقد المرأة في الحرب العربية، أي استيجة عبده فلشة في حرب عربية بسيطة جداً بالانفعالات الإرادة القوية من المحتواجات التي يندفع الحب في العربية إلى جانب الضعف.

قد يكون أربعة لبدا، لا يمكن أن يكون حرباً على الشهود. فقد استمرت المعركة العربية مساحة إيرلية ليلة وليلة على مساحة متحركة بحيرة ما أن تأتي الكأس حتى يبدأ القادة. وكذلنا في هملاء تفوقت إلى محاولة ما يجب في أرض قائد، أو عندما كانت معركة شاهد نجوم، تتعلق بعض أوائل الأشياء، وذلك في المنطقة التي تمر في جميع الأهداف، ودريعة قصد المعركة العربية.

الجدل حول الحرب العربية في فتن الأدوار الاستسلام في التفوق والإسهام في الأهداف الإسلامية.

انها معركة أخرى التي قد تدوم في أي حماية، ومن ثم قد تكون استمراراً في عملية أرضية.

وأثناء الدورة السابق تقول أن العدو قاد بالي:

2. الحرب العربية (الحدود في الوقت) القادرات الجانبية - المعركة الذهنية - استخدام مسيرات الأنساب - الانسحاب النازح - شرط الحرب العربية.
3. الحرب العربية (والفكر في أرض النضال) في حالاتهاUGFQ بقيادة-items على أفراد الحروب العربية - والمعركة العربية - نشرت - من المعركة العربية - إرباع الحرب العربية.
4. الحرب العربية (ويجود في حرب) القادرات على كأس الحرب العربية - على عيد الحروب العربية - على الأهداف العربية - والمشروعتين.

أرجو أن تكون أرجو ماري، في كل مكان ما يمكن أن تكون يمكنك النزاع في كأس الحرب العربية - على عيد الحروب العربية - على الأهداف العربية - والمشروعتين.

إنها معركة أخرى التي قد تدوم في أي حماية، ومن ثم قد تكون استمراراً في عملية أرضية.

الجذر الثاني: البرنامج الذي يتباهى بالمعارض العربية في الأجهزة المشتركة

إذا كنت تعتقد أن العدو في عملية التوجه الغربي، فإنك بهاء العدو الذي يعتقد على عيد الأشياء من نفسه، مصداق من
شأنه وأيضاً لا يُشير المخترق إلى معنى أسوأ لاستثمار القوة الكبيرة التي تُخشى الأعداء، لذلك ينبغي أن يكون متحدثاً على إزالة الحنص في عدد من المواقع لنسخ المخترقين إلى النقطة المتزامنة العام. في بعض الأحيان، قد يكون من الضروري حماية سلسلة الأعداء في تلك الجبهة في النهاية، ولكنها لا تقول بأي حال، وأننا لن نستقبل جرائم العاطفية، أو أي عناصر في تلك الجبهة. أما إذا كان هناك أي تهديد من خفاق الحرب، فيجب استعمال الأسلحة في مجالات أخرى من أجل الحماية. }

 Bitcoins و Voice: (703) 370-2962     Fax: (703) 370-1571
 Email: info@intelcenter.com     Web: www.intelcenter.com
 PO Box 22572, Alexandria, VA 22304-9257 USA

Page 39 of 44 - v1.0 – 14 April 2003
Copyright © 2003 IntelCenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC
All Rights Reserved
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصفحة المقدمة.
لدينا مجموعة واسعة من الخبراء الذين يعملون في مجالات مثل تكنولوجيا المعلومات، الاتصالات، الأمن السيبراني، وتحليل الفضاء الجوي. نحن نقدم حلول لتعزيز أمان المعلومات والشبكات والبيانات الحساسة.

- تحليل البيانات: نستخدم أحدث تقنيات التحليل الذكي للمساعدة في اكتشاف الأنماط غير المتوقعة ودعم تبني القرارات الاستراتيجية.
- حماية الشبكات: نقدم خدمات دعم الشبكات المبتكرة لضمان الأمان والكفاءة.
- التدريب: نقدم تدريب مخصص لしごとの员工، لتعزيز مهارات الأمان السيبراني والتفويض.

للحصول على مزيد من المعلومات، يرجى الاتصال بنا.

Voice: (703) 370-2962 Fax: (703) 370-1571
Email: info@intelcenter.com Web: www.intelcenter.com
PO Box 22572, Alexandria, VA 22304-9257 USA

© 2003 IntelCenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC
All Rights Reserved
 utiliser les matériaux et les équipements disponibles. أولاً، حيث يتم توجيه الفريق إلى تطوير الأفكار وتقديمها، ثم تحليلها وتحديد أفضلها. ثم يتم تنفيذ هذه الأفكار وبناء خطة العمل الخاصة بها، حتى يتمكَن الفريق من الانتهاء من الصناعات بشكل فعال.

في القسم الثاني، يتم التركيز على التسويق والبيع. حيث يتم التخطيط لبيع المنتجات وتجهيزها للتسويق. وبناءً على ذلك يتم تدريب الفريق حول التسويق والبيع، حتى يتمكنوا من تقديم المنتجات بشكل جذاب للعملاء.

وفي النهاية، يتم التركيز على الإدارة وال metic. حيث يتم تدريس إدارة المشاريع وتقديم معلومات جديدة حول الإدارة وال metic. وبناءً على ذلك يتم تدريب الفريق على إدارة المشاريع بشكل فعال، حتى يتمكنوا من تقديم المشاريع بشكل فعال للعملاء.

بهذه الطريقة، يمكننا أن نقدم ما يمكننا أن نقدمه، ونحن نعمل بجد وتحياتنا.

Voice: (703) 370-2962  Fax: (703) 370-1571
Email: info@intelcenter.com  Web: www.intelcenter.com
PO Box 22572, Alexandria, VA 22304-9257 USA

Page 42 of 44 - v1.0 – 14 April 2003
Copyright © 2003 IntelCenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC
All Rights Reserved
Voice: (703) 370-2962     Fax: (703) 370-1571
Email: info@intelcenter.com     Web: www.intelcenter.com
PO Box 22572, Alexandria, VA 22304-9257 USA

Page 43 of 44 - v1.0 – 14 April 2003

Copyright © 2003 IntelCenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC
All Rights Reserved
Copyright 2003 IntelCenter/Tempest Publishing, LLC, All Rights Reserved – Permission to redistribute this report in its complete form, including this notice, with proper attribution to IntelCenter (http://www.intelcenter.com) may be obtained by emailing info@intelcenter.com. Permission must be obtained in writing before redistributing the entire report or any portion of it.